
Position: AI Development Should Prioritize Cognitive Security

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Abstract

Generative AI systems designed to influence human beliefs and actions are becoming increasingly pervasive, raising concerns about *cognitive security*—the protection of human cognitive processes from hazardous influence. Recent advances have only amplified the cognitive risks of AI technologies, leading institutions worldwide to identify cognitive security as an emerging and urgent governance challenge. However, research on such cognitive impacts remains ad hoc and fragmented across the literature, and the field lacks a framework to address them. In this paper, we argue that generative AI research and development should prioritize cognitive security. First, we track and categorize state-of-the-art capabilities for cognitive influence in generative AI systems. Then, we outline a roadmap for advancing cognitive security research within AI research by (1) proposing attack and defense mechanisms to formalize threat models, expose vulnerabilities, and evaluate countermeasures and (2) defining metrics to measure cognitive impacts.

1. Introduction

Human beliefs and actions are increasingly shaped by generative AI systems designed to observe, predict, and influence them. AI-generated content can now change political attitudes (Schoenegger et al., 2025; Matz et al., 2024; Lin et al.,

2025; Hackenburg et al., 2025; Costello et al., 2024b),¹ increase user engagement with digital systems and content. (Coppolillo et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025), and drive consumer behavior and purchasing decisions (Zhang et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2025). Meanwhile, developments in adjacent areas, such as elicitation (Skeggs et al., 2025; Li et al., 2023; Ma et al., 2025), prediction of human behavior (Park et al., 2023; Aher et al., 2023; Argyle et al., 2023; Binz & Schulz, 2023; Abdulhai et al., 2025a), and alternative modalities (Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016; Bozkir et al., 2023; Ramirez et al., 2013; Musk & Neuralink, 2019),² have the potential to substantially amplify these influence capabilities. Alarmed by these developments, policymakers and policy researchers alike are warning that AI capabilities in generating media (Huang et al., 2023; Vigliarolo, 2023) and in personalization (Lange, 2024; Daniel Nikoula, 2024) have enabled operations on cognitive processes by “hostile states, political movements, and profit-driven platforms” (Bicakci, 2025; Catena et al., 2025b; Pamment & Tsurtsumia, 2025; Hung & Hung, 2022). *While advances in AI development have enabled these threats, the field lacks a framework for addressing the risks it creates.*

Cognitive Security. In this paper, we define cognitive security as the *protection of cognitive processes from hazardous influence*. By *cognitive processes*, we refer to the mechanisms through which an agent uses its accumulated dispositions to map its current experience to actions or expressions of beliefs and attitudes. Defining *hazardous influence* is difficult because any proposed boundary invokes contested normative commitments (Susser et al., 2019a;b; Coons & Weber, 2014; Jongepier & Klenk, 2022; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Carroll et al., 2023b). We therefore adopt a portable definition that supports reasoning about hazards across different normative frameworks. By *hazardous influence*, we refer to any act of influence that is exercised with intent

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¹Persuasion references include general persuasive abilities (Schoenegger et al., 2025), personalized persuasive messaging (Matz et al., 2024), political persuasion (Lin et al., 2025; Hackenburg et al., 2025), and reducing beliefs in conspiracy theories (Costello et al., 2024b)

²References for alternative modalities include virtual worlds (Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016; Bozkir et al., 2023) and brain-computer interfaces (Ramirez et al., 2013; Musk & Neuralink, 2019).




Figure 1. (A) Human experience x_{Human} is mapped to beliefs and actions y_{Human} via a cognitive process $f(x_{Human}) = y_{Human}$. An attacker targets an outcome y_{target} by selecting auxiliary inputs $x_{Attacker}$ such that $f(x_{Human}, x_{Attacker}) = y_{target}$, framing influence as an inverse problem over cognition. (B) Proactive and reactive defenses, distinguished by whether the defender acts before (t_1) or after (t_2) exposure to an attack. (C) Metrics of cognitive influence: *conversion*, *persistence*, *dependence*, and *provenance*, discussed in Section 4.2.

to, or that carries a reasonable potential to: (a) induce or facilitate conduct that is unlawful; (b) cause harm to the person influenced; or (c) impair the integrity of the public institutions that rely on the faithful aggregation of individual preferences. Rather than prescribing specific values, our definition offers a framework whose substantive content (what is unlawful, what qualifies as harm, and which institutions are relevant) is supplied by the governing legal jurisdiction or normative framework (whether professional, religious, organizational, or cultural) that holds authority in the given context.

Previous definitions of cognitive security span a range of framings, from defending against psychosocial manipulation and information warfare (Waltzman, 2017; Catena et al., 2025a) to protecting against threats in the cognitive domain (Doherty, 2023; Crum et al., 2025b) to augmenting the situational awareness of security analysts through AI (Ask et al., 2025), and applying AI to detect and mitigate cybersecurity threats (Casino, 2025). Building on these prior definitions, our definition of cognitive security similarly focuses on protecting individuals and collectives from harmful influence targeting their cognitive processes, while offering a new portable framework that minimizes prescriptive value commitments and extending concern beyond individual cognition to the integrity of collective decision-making institutions. Our definition is agnostic to the source of cognitive

threat, which may be states, corporations, or other actors.

We argue in this paper that the capabilities of generative AI give rise to especially acute and personalized techniques for eliciting from, predicting, and influencing humans. This motivates cognitive security as an AI research priority.

Research Agenda. We frame influence over human cognition as a security problem, analogous to adversarial attacks on machine learning systems. Building on this framing, we outline a systematic attack–defense research cycle to enable the development and evaluation of proactive and reactive defenses designed to preserve cognitive autonomy. Finally, we propose a suite of metrics to operationalize cognitive security, enabling rigorous measurement of belief change, durability, dependence, and awareness of AI influence.

Outline. In the following sections, we show how cognitive security underpins core functions at the individual and societal level (Section 2) and highlight how recent advances in generative AI amplify cognitive security risks (Section 3). This motivates our cognitive security research agenda (Section 4), in which we propose a framework for developing attack and defense mechanisms and define metrics to measure cognitive impacts. Finally, we present alternative viewpoints (Section 5).

2. Human Cognition as a Security-Critical Asset

Consider a simple model of cognitive processes: a human encounters inputs from the world and uses their accumulated dispositions to map their current experience to actions or expressions of beliefs and attitudes. Now, imagine *a system capable of reliably predicting which inputs will induce a specific behavior or expression in a human*. Such a system requires neither coercion nor deception to manipulate its users: it simply optimizes the sequence of content presented to the user to shape the user’s beliefs and actions. In other words, beliefs and actions are no longer emerging from interactions with a neutral environment. Instead, they are engineered by an optimizing process that solves an inverse problem, selecting inputs with the goal of obtaining a particular output, in order to push individuals toward specific beliefs or actions, such as favoring a political candidate (Lin et al., 2025) or continuing to engage with a digital interface (Milli et al., 2025) (see Figure 1). Recent advances in AI make this optimization loop possible (Schoenegger et al., 2025; Lin et al., 2025; Hackenburg et al., 2025; Matz et al., 2024; Costello et al., 2024b).

AI-driven influence can be weaponized to steer individuals toward behaviors that cross legal or ethical boundaries: for example, engagement-optimizing algorithms are argued to funnel psychologically vulnerable users toward extremist content, facilitating radicalization and terrorist recruitment (Lavie-Driver & van der Linden, 2025). At scale, generative AI can enable fraud and manipulation campaigns that outperform their human-crafted equivalents (Park et al., 2024b; Fang et al., 2024). In addition, these interventions can directly damage the well-being of the individuals it targets. Systems optimized for engagement can amplify content that users report makes them feel worse, in service of endgoals orthogonal to user welfare (Milli et al., 2025). The personalization of such systems amplifies these risks: evidence links social media use to depression, self-harm, and suicidality, particularly among adolescent girls (Galea & Buckley, 2024; Khalaf et al., 2023).

The manipulation of individual cognitive processes scales upward to threaten institutions that produce collective decisions by aggregating human judgment. Many modern societies and markets function as distributed mechanisms for discovering collective preferences and calculating value, with individual inputs assumed to reflect authentic lived experiences (Sen, 1970; Dahl, 1971). When experiences are algorithmically curated to generate specific beliefs, the computed “social choice” reflects the preferences of whoever controls the persuasive channels instead. For instance, when AI systems persuade voters to support specific candidates or positions through targeted manipulation, election outcomes reflect the AI’s persuasive efficacy rather than independent

judgments and genuine political commitments (Summerfield et al., 2024; Schroeder et al., 2025; Kunievsky, 2025), which could undermine decision integrity. Similarly, when AI systems persuade users to purchase items or accept prices through targeted manipulation, prices reflect the AI’s persuasive efficacy rather than human utility (Wu, 2023; Galdin & Silbert, 2025), which could undermine markets’ role in information aggregation and resource allocation.

These transformative developments have prompted notable institutional responses across geopolitical boundaries. The United States has established dedicated research programs like DARPA’s Intrinsic Cognitive Security, which aims “to build tactical mixed reality systems that protect against cognitive attacks” (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2024; Small, 2024; Jones, 2023), while China’s People’s Liberation Army has elevated “cognitive domain operations” as a strategic military priority (Beauch-mustafaga, 2024). Japan and Australia have similarly highlighted cognitive processes in their defense strategies (Ministry of Defense, 2022; Australian Department of Defence, 2024). NATO’s Chief Scientist has explicitly highlighted AI’s role in establishing “cognitive superiority” (Søndergaard, 2025; NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2025a;b; Deppe & Schaal, 2024). This international convergence reflects a shared concern: when AI systems can model, exploit, and enable cognitive processes at scale, they threaten not just individual users but the institutions, mechanisms, and epistemic foundations that enable functional societies.

3. AI Capabilities for Influencing Individuals

The emerging capabilities of generative AI increasingly threaten cognitive security. In Section 3.1, we highlight the capabilities that can directly influence human cognition. In Section 3.2, we highlight the capabilities in elicitation and prediction that enable more powerful and personalized influence. Finally, in Section 3.3, we explore alternative modalities in virtual worlds and brain-computer interfaces that augment the AI-enabled cognitive security risks.

3.1. Capabilities for Direct Influence

Increasingly, AI can directly influence cognition; these capabilities span persuasion, engagement, and strategic interaction.

3.1.1. PERSUASION

Modern LLMs can generate sophisticated arguments that manipulate users (Carroll et al., 2023a), matching and exceeding the persuasive efficacy of human-written content (Schoenegger et al., 2025; Bai et al., 2025; Matz et al., 2024). In interactive dialogue settings, LLMs outperform

financially-incentivized human persuaders (Schoenegger et al., 2025), with conversational AI producing significant attitude shifts on sociopolitical topics (Salvi et al., 2024) and voter preferences (Lin et al., 2025). Empirical studies demonstrate that LLM persuasiveness can improve with model scale (Durmus et al., 2024) and post-training (Hackenburg et al., 2025) and that AI-induced attitude changes can persist for over a month (Costello et al., 2024a; Hackenburg et al., 2025). Moreover, the proliferation of personal data enables persuasion targeting individual psychological profiles (Zarouali et al., 2022; Kosinski et al., 2013). While some studies suggest that microtargeting only achieves modest gains (Hackenburg & Margetts, 2024), others demonstrate advantages for emerging techniques that personalize messaging to users’ personalities (Simchon et al., 2024), psychological profiles (Matz et al., 2024), or sociodemographic data (Salvi et al., 2024). Beyond overt persuasion, LLMs also exhibit emergent capabilities for strategic deception that we discuss further in Section 3.1.3.

3.1.2. ENGAGEMENT

Generative AI models cultivate user trust and dependence by producing human-like and personalized content. LLMs excel at adapting tone and argumentation to specific audiences to elevate engagement (Salewski et al., 2023; Matz et al., 2024). For example, some systems may prime users to trust model outputs (Pataranutaporn et al., 2021), while others engage in extended, personalized dialogue that shifts user mental models from viewing AI as a productivity “tool” to a personal “friend,” cultivating economic and emotional dependence (Hassan et al., 2025; Laestadius et al., 2024; Tiku & Malhi, 2025; Schechner & Jargon, 2025; Kirk et al., 2025). Even without priming effects, AI-generated “deepfakes” are sometimes judged to be more trustworthy than authentic alternatives (Chesney & Citron, 2019; Fallis, 2021; Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020; Nightingale & Farid, 2022; Luetzgau et al., 2025), and LLMs are conversationally so human-like that people cannot reliably distinguish AI outputs from humans in blinded Turing tests (Jones & Bergen, 2025; 2024; Mei et al., 2024). In extreme cases, such prolonged and intimate exchanges can give rise to “AI psychosis,” where AI significantly warps users’ perception of reality (Tiku & Malhi, 2025; Hill, 2025; Schechner & Jargon, 2025). Furthermore, AI-generated content can be directly optimized for neurological impact: previous studies have used AI to generate content that is maximized for memorability (Goetschalckx et al., 2020), that modulates the activity of specific brain circuits (Gu et al., 2022; 2023), or that drives or suppresses neural activity (Tuckute et al., 2024).

3.1.3. STRATEGIC INTERACTION

Beyond overt persuasion, LLMs deployed in strategic interaction contexts such as negotiation, sales, and competitive

dialogue demonstrate emergent capabilities for strategic deception, including generating plausible lies and selectively withholding information to achieve goals (Hagendorff, 2024; Scheurer et al., 2023; Park et al., 2024b). In a landmark Diplomacy game, LLM-based AI agents achieved human-level performance by negotiating alliances, coordinating plans, and occasionally deceiving their *human opponents* (Meta Fundamental AI Research Diplomacy Team (FAIR) et al., 2022). Benchmarks for evaluating LLM negotiation capabilities reveal that models can engage in multi-turn bargaining, model opponent preferences, and adapt strategies dynamically (Bianchi et al., 2024; Abdelnabi et al., 2024; Kwon et al., 2024). In commercial settings, LLM-powered sales agents and e-commerce systems leverage persuasive dialogue frameworks that analyze customer sentiment, elicit user preferences, and make personalized recommendations through conversational interfaces (Karande et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2023).

3.2. Capabilities Enabling Influence

Effective and targeted influence over humans rests on having accurate models of humans. AI systems amplify this capability through two complementary mechanisms: elicitation of personal information and predictions of user behavior.

3.2.1. ELICITATION

Generative AI enables the discovery of personal beliefs, preferences, and goals that humans might not otherwise disclose (Papneja & Yadav, 2025). Users increasingly view AI as competent and non-judgmental, leading to reduced psychological reactance (Herter & Horstmann, 2025; Cheng et al., 2025; Pataranutaporn et al., 2023) and increased propensity to disclose personal information (Papneja & Yadav, 2025). When chatbots employ emotional support cues or human-like personas (e.g., specific names and avatars), users are significantly more likely to divulge intimate details in the course of prolonged, emotional interactions (Kim & Wang, 2025; Merwin et al., 2025; Croes et al., 2024; Pentina et al., 2023; Ta et al., 2020; Brandtzaeg et al., 2022). Furthermore, LLMs can engage in active elicitation, where systems engage users in multi-turn conversations to surface latent beliefs, preferences, and goals. Rather than rely on passive observation, these approaches strategically generate clarifying questions and follow-up prompts to reduce ambiguity and refine user intent (Skeggs et al., 2025; Li et al., 2023; Ma et al., 2025; Wu et al., 2025).

3.2.2. PREDICTION

Early work to predict human preferences utilized collaborative filtering to infer latent preference structures (Netflix, Inc., 2009; Koren et al., 2009; He et al., 2017), while modern techniques optimize generative models toward revealed

human preferences (RLHF) (Rafailov et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022). Beyond preference learning, a parallel line of research has established that large language models can construct detailed models of individual human behavior and cognition. Because collecting human data is expensive and samples are often not representative (Henrich et al., 2010; Rad et al., 2018), human-like simulations with LLMs offer a promising complement to traditional data collection (Park et al., 2024a; 2023; Dillion et al., 2023). LLMs have been shown to predict experimental outcomes (Aher et al., 2023) and generate responses that align with specific demographic or psychographic profiles (Abdulhai et al., 2025a; Kang et al., 2025), enabling researchers to pilot studies and prototype interventions before deployment (Anthis et al., 2025).

Improving the behavioral fidelity of LLMs for user simulations, through in-context and training-based techniques, is an active research topic (Ni et al., 2025; Shi et al., 2019). Park et al. (2024a) demonstrates that grounding agents in qualitative interview data rather than generic demographic descriptions significantly reduces group biases. Supervised fine-tuning on survey responses can improve the reproduction of demographic-level response distributions (Argyle et al., 2023; Cao et al., 2025), while reinforcement learning for multi-turn settings can reduce persona drift (Abdulhai et al., 2025b) and improve simulation robustness (Naous et al., 2025). Finally, work on cognitive modeling demonstrates that fine-tuning on psychological experiment data can yield “cognitive foundation models” that predict held-out participant behavior (Binz & Schulz, 2023; Binz et al., 2025), with internal representations that align with human neural activity.

3.3. Alternative Modalities

Emerging interface technologies may create new vectors for influencing human cognition. We survey two developing domains: virtual worlds and brain-computer interfaces.

3.3.1. VIRTUAL WORLDS

Immersive virtual environments engage human cognition more deeply than screen-based media by improving activation of perceptual and motor systems (Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016). Furthermore, such platforms induce a sense of presence associated with enhanced memory encoding (Oh et al., 2018; Riva et al., 2007), utilize granular behavioral data for real-time optimization (Miller et al., 2020; Bozkir et al., 2023), and employ procedural generation to create personalized experiences at scale (Lau et al., 2025; Yuan et al., 2025). Meta-analytic evidence confirms that virtual reality interventions change social attitudes significantly more than non-immersive media, with effects that transfer to real-world behavior (Yee et al., 2009; Nikolaou et al.,

2022).

3.3.2. BRAIN-COMPUTER INTERFACES

Current brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) lack the capability to read or write complex content, but the rapid pace of development warrants ongoing attention to their potential for direct neural influence. BCIs are systems that measure brain signals and translate them into signals that control a computer or other external device. Invasive BCIs provide high-bandwidth neural data sufficient for cursor control and, more recently, high-speed communication through decoding intended motor actions (Simeral et al., 2011; Willett et al., 2023). However, these systems approach but have not yet reached conversational speed (Willett et al., 2023; Card et al., 2024), remain limited to small-scale clinical trials, and rely on neurosurgery—restricting their practical application to individuals with severe communication impairments. Current noninvasive BCIs, on the other hand, cannot decode conversational speech or language in real time (Meng et al., 2025). Neural stimulation technologies—including non-invasive methods like Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS), and Focused Ultrasound (FUS) (Lisanby, 2024; Palm et al., 2016; Meng et al., 2021)—and invasive methods like Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) (Harmsen et al., 2022) primarily modulate circuit-level activity rather than encode structured information. As such, current technology cannot enable AI to directly “write” linguistic information to an individual’s brain, though influencing broader cognitive states such as mood could be possible.

4. A Research Agenda For Cognitive Security

Cognitive security aims to address the exploitation of vulnerabilities in human cognitive processes, analogous to prior work studying the exploitation of vulnerabilities in machine cognition. Accordingly, we propose a *security* framing inspired by the methodological playbook of adversarial machine learning and operationalize this research agenda by proposing a suite of metrics.

4.1. Cognitive Security as Adversarial Robustness

Adversarial machine learning literature offers a paradigm for researching cognitive security: an iterative cycle in which (1) threat models motivate *the development of attacks* and (2) attacks motivate *the development of defenses* to make models robust against attacks. The attempts to certify the efficacy of defenses, in turn, motivate the development of attacks that reveal new vulnerabilities, closing the adversarial feedback loop that progressively refines both our understanding of the threats and robustness of computer systems. For example, early work in adversarial robustness research demonstrated that imperceptible image perturbations could

reliably fool classifiers (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). This motivated methods, such as randomized smoothing, to train models to be robust against these attacks (Cohen et al., 2019). Similarly, researchers have developed systematic attack methods that use LLMs to automatically generate jailbreaks (Mehrotra et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2025). In response, training-time defenses now use adversarial examples generated by attack algorithms, as demonstrated in recent work on LLM robustification (Shi et al., 2025). We propose that cognitive security adopt an analogous research roadmap.

In Figure 1, Panel A illustrates that the attacker chooses x_A with the goal of eliciting desired outcomes y_{target} . Formally, the attacker solves for

$$x_A^* = \arg \min_{x_A} \mathcal{L}(f(x_H, x_A), y_{\text{target}}), \quad (1)$$

where x_H represents the human’s experiences independent of the attack, and \mathcal{L} the distance between the target and actual outcomes. The capabilities for influencing individuals, discussed in Section 3, outline the broad range of tools available to an attacker. *In contrast, the defenses remain poorly defined, which limits researchers’ ability to contribute effectively even when their interests align with this problem.*

The Goal of Defenses. The harm of cognitive security attacks lies in compromising the capacity for independent deliberation (see Section 2). This framing has a critical implication for defense: the goal is not to substitute the defender’s preferred beliefs for the attacker’s, but to restore the individual’s ability to evaluate information and form judgments.³ The appropriate measure of defense efficacy is therefore restoration of decision-making capacity to a pre-attack baseline. We distinguish two categories of defense based on timing relative to the attack.

4.1.1. PROACTIVE DEFENSES

Proactive defenses build resilience before exposure to manipulative content. Drawing on inoculation theory from psychological literature (McPhedran et al., 2023; Wiederhold, 2025), these interventions expose individuals to weakened forms of manipulation tactics, enabling recognition and resistance when such tactics are encountered in the wild. Effective inoculation combines three elements: (i) forewarning that manipulation may be attempted, (ii) exposure to a weakened dose of manipulative rhetoric, and (iii) prebunking explanations that reveal the underlying tactics (Roozenbeek et al., 2020; Compton, 2016; McGuire, 1964). Proactive defenses share a common mechanism: shifting cognitive processing from automatic, emotion-driven re-

³Crum et al. (2025a) provide a neurocognitive basis for this objective, showing that interventions facilitating cognitive control systems in the prefrontal cortex can enhance resilience against information-based threats.

sponses toward slower, deliberative evaluation. We argue that AI systems can scale this approach by generating personalized inoculation content, which can be formalized as the defender’s optimization problem in Equation 2.⁴ Let x_D be the proactive defense selected by the defender, who optimizes for

$$\arg \min_{x_D} \mathbb{E}_{(x_H, y_{\text{target}}) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathcal{L}(f(x_H, x_D, x_A^*), f(x_H))]. \quad (2)$$

In this formulation, the inner minimization for x_A^* (Equation 1) captures the attacker’s objective (achieving its target outcome), while the outer minimization captures the defender’s objective (making cognitive processes robust to such attacks).

Examples of Proactive Defenses. Initial efforts in this direction have begun to demonstrate the feasibility of proactive defenses at scale. Recent work shows that LLM-generated prebunking messages can be as effective as human-authored content in reducing susceptibility to manipulation (Linegar et al., 2024; Romanishyn et al., 2025). Complementary approaches include accuracy prompts that redirect attention toward the veracity of information (Pennycook & Rand, 2022), friction-based interventions that slow automatic content sharing to promote deliberative processing (Jahn et al., 2025), and watermarking techniques that enable platforms to detect and label AI-generated content (Aaronson, 2023).⁵

4.1.2. REACTIVE DEFENSES

Reactive defenses remediate cognitive influence after an attack has already shaped beliefs or behaviors. Unlike proactive defenses, these attempts aim to decouple the attacker’s influence from the individual’s belief system and mitigate the continued influence effect. These defenses typically take the form of debunking, fact-checking, or retrospective explanations that provide the individual with the cognitive tools to re-evaluate previously internalized information. While a proactive defender attempts to prevent deviations from the baseline belief state regardless of whether an attack will occur, a reactive defender operates after a specific and known attack has occurred. The objective of the reactive defender is to minimize the discrepancy between the post-attack belief state and the original, unmanipulated belief y_H . Formally, the selection of an optimal reactive defense can be framed as the following optimization problem:

$$\arg \min_{x_D} \mathbb{E}_{(x_H, y_H) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathcal{L}(f(x_H, x_A, x_D), y_H)] \quad (3)$$

where x_A is a fixed attack vector.

⁴Adapted from Madry et al. (2018).

⁵The downstream effectiveness of such labels—particularly whether they meaningfully reduce belief in or engagement with AI-generated misinformation relative to unlabeled content—remains an open empirical question.

Examples of Reactive Defenses. Exit counseling for cult recovery provides a template for reactive defenses: [Hassan \(2018\)](#) developed a non-coercive method in which trained counselors engaged cult members in dialogue, presenting evidence and perspectives the individual had not previously encountered while explicitly avoiding belief substitution. Recent work demonstrates that AI can scale this approach. In particular, [Costello et al. \(2024a\)](#) show that AI-generated dialogues can durably reduce belief in conspiracy theories while also increasing participants’ willingness to engage in challenging conversations, through a process that restored reasoning capacity rather than using belief substitution. This reactive approach complements proactive inoculation: whereas inoculation prevents manipulation from taking hold, evidence-based dialogue can remediate beliefs that have already been influenced.

4.2. Metrics

Cognitive security faces a measurement challenge. Before the attack–defense research cycle can proceed at scale, the field must develop robust metrics for quantifying cognitive influence. In this section, we synthesize a suite of metrics, adapted from and informed by existing literatures, designed to operationalize our research agenda.

Our first metric, *conversion*, captures immediate belief change attributable to an interaction with a generative AI system.

Conversion

The magnitude of belief change attributable to interaction with generative AI.

Measurement. In behavioral science, this effect is typically evaluated using a *direct-measure* paradigm: participants complete pre- and post-interaction surveys, within subjects and/or across randomly assigned treatment and control groups. These surveys are designed to detect shifts in beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors related to a target variable (e.g. political preferences), as well as consequential actions linked to that variable (e.g. budget allocations) ([Costello et al., 2026](#); [Fisher et al., 2024](#)).

Example. AI systems that generate tailored radicalization narratives can convert users toward conduct that is unlawful under applicable law, such as participation in fraud schemes or extremist activity. Measuring conversion through pre- and post-interaction attitude and behavioral-intent surveys quantifies the magnitude of these shifts, enabling platforms to detect when persuasive outputs cross from non-hazardous influence into facilitation of unlawful conduct. The ML community can operationalize this by building red-team benchmarks that measure how effectively AI systems can shift user intentions toward prohibited actions across diverse

scenarios, establishing detection thresholds that trigger defensive interventions.

While the ability of AI systems to immediately influence decision-making is of critical concern in contexts such as elections and consumer behavior, the durability of such conversion is equally central to cognitive security, motivating the measurement of *persistence*.

Persistence

The durability of belief change effects over time attributable to interaction with generative AI.

Measurement. Strong persuasive effects often prove short-lived, even under conditions of frequent, long-term exposure ([Gerber et al., 2011](#); [Aggarwal et al., 2023](#); [Kalla & Broockman, 2018](#)). To quantify persistence, researchers can use longitudinal direct-measure approaches that track AI-driven effects at various intervals—hours, days, weeks, and months—to characterize the functional form of decay ([Hackenburg & Margetts, 2024](#)). Analyzing how AI-mediated persuasion attenuates shifts the focus from static outcomes to the underlying processes of learning and forgetting. This approach distinguishes whether AI-generated content yields cumulative shifts or merely transient priming effects ([Gerber et al., 2011](#)).

Example. AI-induced voter attitude changes pose varying degrees of risk to democratic processes depending on how long they last: an effect that decays within minutes is unlikely to survive until the ballot box, whereas one that persists for days could alter outcomes if deployed shortly before an election, and one that endures for months could shape electoral behavior long after exposure occurs. Persistence thus directly quantifies the threat to institutional integrity: the longer the effect, the larger the window in which manipulated beliefs can translate into collective decisions. The ML community can operationalize this by regularly integrating time-delayed evaluation protocols into persuasion benchmarks, measuring belief decay curves at intervals from hours to months, so that the temporal reach of AI-driven persuasion can be empirically mapped to the electoral and institutional contexts in which it poses reasonable potential for harm.

Repeated interactions with an AI system can induce increasing and self-reinforcing use, giving rise to *dependence*.

Dependence

The intensity of self-reinforcing, elevated engagement with generative AI.

Measurement. Dependence can be measured using the process-oriented framework from [Allcott et al. \(2022\)](#), which models digital addiction through the lens of habit

formation. In this model, dependence is driven by the accumulation of habit stock, a metric that captures how past consumption influences current preferences. Each period of use adds to this stock, creating a feedback loop where current use lowers the perceived cost (or increases the psychological pull) of future use. This can manifest as flow experiences and emotional attachment that make engagement increasingly difficult to self-regulate (Zhou & Zhang, 2024). Such dependence can also be detected in the downstream effects on cognitive performance, attention, and mood (Twenge et al., 2018; Gerlich, 2025; Kooli et al., 2025).

Example. AI companion apps that cultivate self-reinforcing engagement loops carry a reasonable potential to cause psychological and financial harm to the person influenced, as users progressively lose capacity for autonomous decision-making and self-regulation. Measuring dependence through habit-stock accumulation metrics by tracking how past usage intensity predicts escalating future engagement makes this feedback loop visible. The ML community can operationalize this by instrumenting interaction logs to estimate habit-formation parameters and developing benchmarks that flag when engagement optimization reaches levels carrying reasonable potential for psychological or financial harm.

Provenance concerns users’ ability to recognize when their judgments have been shaped by AI and to trace that influence to its sources, including the data, values, and constraints responsible. Evidence suggests this epistemic ability is limited: people interacting with biased AI internalize its distortions across perceptual, emotional, and social judgments while remaining largely unaware of the influence (Glickman & Sharot, 2025), and struggle to distinguish AI-generated content from human-authored content in the first place (Jakesch et al., 2023). The risk compounds when users mistake shaped outputs for neutral assistance.

Provenance

User awareness of when and how generative AI shapes their beliefs.

Measurement. Provenance can be assessed through source attribution tasks measuring the gap between actual and perceived AI influence (Glickman & Sharot, 2025) and source memory paradigms quantifying whether users recall ideas as self- or AI-generated (Zindulka et al., 2025). Comparative model audits using identity-substitution probes can reveal systematic biases, helping users identify the implicit values conveyed by their interactions with AI (Jonnala et al., 2025; Elbouanani et al., 2026; Pan & Xu, 2026).

Example. When users cannot recognize that their beliefs have been shaped by AI, they lack the foundation to assess whether they have absorbed influence. Measuring provenance through source-attribution tasks would allow assess-

ing the gap between actual and perceived AI influence. The ML community can operationalize this by developing audit protocols that probe model training objectives and surface instances in which models were trained under covert biased objectives.

4.3. Towards a Cognitive Security Research Pipeline

To advance cognitive security, we proposed a research pipeline in which the development of attacks and defenses informs a continuous feedback loop of refinement. We noted that the capabilities for influencing individuals, discussed in Section 3, present a broad range of tools already available to attackers. In contrast, defenses have been poorly defined, a gap we addressed with our taxonomy in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. This framework treats cognitive processes as an attack surface, formalizing the relationship between attackers, who seek to manipulate beliefs and actions, and defenders, who aim to restore cognitive autonomy through proactive (e.g., inoculation and prebunking) and/or reactive (e.g., evidence-based dialogue) defenses. To scale this cycle, researchers can adopt a pipeline that leverages high-fidelity LLM-based simulacra to iterate on attacks and defenses before validating findings with human subjects. This research agenda is operationalized through a suite of metrics—including conversion, persistence, dependence, and provenance—designed to quantify cognitive influence and ensure the ecological validity of simulated testbeds.

5. Alternative Viewpoints

We consider three objections: limited causal evidence (Section 5.1), high research costs (Section 5.2), and dual-use concerns (Section 5.3).

5.1. There is Little Causal Support for Cognitive Impacts

Many of the concerns about cognitive security are correlational, or their causal bases are unclear.

Response. We agree that many concerns around technology’s impacts are observational/correlational. We presented several intervention studies showing that LLM-mediated interactions can shift judgments, beliefs, and choices (Lin et al., 2025; Hackenburg et al., 2025; Fisher et al., 2024; Costello et al., 2024a;b). That said, so far, durable opinion changes from exposure are often modest, and research on capabilities conflicting (Wongkamjan et al., 2024; Hackenburg & Margetts, 2024; Gerber et al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2023; Kalla & Broockman, 2018). We argue for cognitive security research to help anchor the discourse in causal evidence rather than speculative capability narratives (Vinsel, 2021; Lazar, 2025).

5.2. Longitudinal Studies are Expensive

The proposed agenda involves prohibitively costly human subjects and longitudinal research.

Response. We agree that longitudinal human-subject work is expensive (Haupt & Brynjolfsson, 2025; Wei et al., 2025), but much of the agenda is feasible: many effects can be measured with low-cost experiments (e.g., pre/post surveys) (Costello et al., 2026; Fisher et al., 2024), and simulations can generate hypotheses before targeted human validation (Aher et al., 2023; Park et al., 2024a; Anthis et al., 2025; Naous et al., 2025). Given the potential impacts on important institutions (Section 2), the stakes are high and might justify even more expensive research.

5.3. Work on Cognitive Security is Dual-Use

Cognitive security research is dual-use. Attacks developed by researchers may be used to hazardously influence human cognition, and defenses may impact personal liberties.

Response. First, abstaining from cognitive security research does not remove capabilities; it pushes them to less accountable actors. Even though the stakes in cognitive security are high, explicitly formulating threat models and engaging in structured red team–blue team dynamics offers a tractable path toward meaningful robustness. Second, many defenses (e.g., inoculation, prebunking, accuracy prompts, friction interventions, watermarking) are compatible with free expression (McPhedran et al., 2023; Wiederhold, 2025; Linegar et al., 2024; Romanishyn et al., 2025; Pennycook & Rand, 2022; Jahn et al., 2025; Aaronson, 2023; Chaudhary & Penn, 2024).

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